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Arguments from the nineteenth century concerning whether Hegel was 
an atheist or a theist are still ongoing. This paper examines Hegel’s 
philosophical and theological milieu, his influence on the history of philosophy 
and on politics, his unique interpretation of the unity of theology and 
philosophy, and his unusually sanguine interpretation of the relationship 
between church and state, along with special problems he discerned in the 
emergence of democracies. 
 
In graduate courses I have taught on G. W. F. Hegel, I usually 
start off soliciting opinions from students, to see if they have been 
affected by any Hegelian prejudgements or stereotypes. The responses 
I get are varied. Some may have heard of Hegel’s reputation for being 
difficult or even incomprehensible; some may have come across 
criticisms of Hegel’s alleged secularism or gnosticism by Leo Strauss, 
Eric Voegelin, Karl Löwith, and others; those with a background in 
Anglo-American analytic philosophy may have an image of Hegel as an 
other-worldly idealist; or a student may have been exposed to some of 
the nineteenth-century satirical plays about Hegel, such as Lindner’s 
The Absolute Boot, with comical images of Germans trying to interpret 
ordinary realities in sophisticated Hegelian fashion. 
Such responses give me an opening for clarification. I try to 
relieve anxieties about Hegel’s alleged incomprehensibility by pointing 
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out, first of all, that rumors of Hegel’s difficulty are much exaggerated. 
One avoidable obstacle to reading Hegel is his special technical 
terminology: he uses terms like “concept,” “reason,” “abstract,” 
“concrete,” “individual,” etc., in ways completely different from our 
ordinary usage; thus I include glossaries in some of my books on 
Hegel. Also, I point out, it is important to understand Hegel’s special 
interpretation of the history of philosophy. According to Hegel, the 
entire history of Western philosophy since Parmenides has been 
concerned primarily with the relationship between thought and being, 
and this concern has come to a head in modern philosophy after 
Descartes’s famous “I think, therefore I am”—a new approach, 
focusing on existence within subjectivity. The “Copernican revolution in 
philosophy,” initiated by Kant, was the next logical step after 
Descartes, beginning not with being, but with the structures of thought 
(i.e., subjectivity). And the subsequent auseinandersetzung with Kant 
is where we catch up with Hegel. 
Kant famously argued that all traditional metaphysics, 
concerned with ideas about God, cosmology, the human soul, and 
freedom, was an invalid attempt to go beyond the limits of our 
subjective powers of knowing; and ethics, according to Kant, had to be 
based on purely subjective rational considerations—a “Categorical 
Imperative” that requires us to test our personal moral maxims for 
logical consistency, to see whether or not we individually could 
consistently wish all humans to have the same maxims. 
Hegel saw such Kantian challenges to traditional metaphysics 
and ethics as problems that needed to be addressed. Thus he begins 
his encyclopedic system of philosophy with a reestablished 
metaphysics allegedly unassailable by the Kantian critique (the first 
two-thirds of his “Logic”), and in his Phenomenology of Spirit 
characterizes Kant’s ethics as a “nest of contradictions,” arguing that 
an ethics of “pure rationality,” without indebtedness to natural 
inclinations, is a Moralität prone to subjective distortions; that, in a 
true ethics (Sittlichkeit), natural human inclinations are the necessary 
springboard to a viable ethics; and furthermore, that the dialectic of 
rights and duties in the individual conscience must be coordinated with 
the incessant dialectic of rights and duties in society at large. 
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The French existential phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1908–1961), once observed that 
 
Hegel is at the origin of everything important that has been 
done in philosophy in the past century. . . . One could say 
without paradox that giving an interpretation of Hegel is to take 
a position on all the philosophical, political and religious 
problems of our century.1 
 
There are good grounds for this assertion. Even if Hegel was wrong on 
many things, it is important to have some understanding of what he 
was about—at least because of his influence on the history of 
philosophy, and on history itself. 
Karl Marx, for example, in his Postface to the second edition of 
Capital, explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Hegel: “When I 
was working at the first volume of Capital . . . I openly avowed myself 
the pupil of that mighty thinker.” Mark Meaney’s Capital as Organic 
Unity: The Role of Hegel’s Science of Logic in Marx’s Grundrisse2 
leaves us with the impression that Marx may have even had Hegel’s 
Logic next to him on his desk, as he developed his theory of capital. 
A similar indebtedness to Hegel characterizes a completely 
different strand of nineteenth-century philosophy, from the Christian 
existentialist Kierkegaard, who belatedly, and in spite of reservations 
about Hegel’s treatment of individuality, declares:  
 
His philosophical knowledge, his amazing learning, the insight of 
his genius, and everything else good that can be said of a 
philosopher I am willing to acknowledge as any disciple.— Yet, 
no, not acknowledge—that is too distinguished an expression—
willing to admire, willing to learn from him.3 
 
In the twentieth century, in Continental philosophy, phenomenologists, 
existentialists and post-structuralists have attempted to take up where 
Hegel left off: Heidegger lectured on Hegel’s Phenomenology, Sartre 
critiqued Hegel’s theory of the relationship of en soi to pour soi in his 
magisterial Being and Nothingness, and Derrida attempted to 
“deconstruct” Hegel’s alleged “logocentrism” in Glas and other works. 
Anglo-American philosophical currents were also affected; the reaction 
against Hegelian idealism around the beginning of the twentieth 
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century, led by Bertrand Russell, paved the way for analytic 
philosophy, positivism and linguistic philosophy. 
In politics, Hegel’s influence loomed large in the diverse and 
incompatible arenas of communism, fascism, and democracy. Marx’s 
explicit movement to communism had taken place with his 1843 
commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, and Marx studied Hegel’s 
works assiduously—especially (of all things!) Hegel’s Science of Logic; 
Stalin, Lenin and Engels, following in Marx’s footsteps, wrote on 
Hegelian logic, claiming to have discovered therein secrets of 
“dialectic” which could be applied to the material and social world. 
Peter Viereck in Metapolitics traces the influence of Hegelian 
philosophers in Naziism, which took advantage of the Hegelian 
emphasis on the “organic” nature of the state. But democratic political 
philosophers such as Bosanquet, Oakeshott, and, more recently, 
Fukuyama, have also found inspiration in Hegel’s idealistic construal of 
liberalism. 
 
New Initiatives in the Philosophy/Theology 
Interface 
Hegel’s initial career-objectives focused on becoming a Lutheran 
pastor, as he entered the seminary at Tübingen. In his posthumously-
published theological writings from that period,4 he indicates qualms 
he had at this period about “positive religion” (that is, a Christianity 
which compromised its spiritual moorings by focusing too much on 
man-made rituals and doctrines), and he advocates recapturing the 
“spirit of Christianity.” He contrasts the demeanor of Lutherans fearing 
disease from other members of their congregation, as they take the 
cup at the Lord’s Supper, with the spontaneous and joyful religious 
rites of the ancient Greeks; and he asks rhetorically why Lutheran 
bishops would still conduct the ritual of washing the feet of the 
congregation as a sign of “service,” when in reality servants in the 
modern world no longer perform such actions. He saw the essence of 
Christianity as consisting in love—not as an abstract ideal, but as a 
spirit consolidating a community and expanding naturally beyond the 
bounds of the community even into the body politic. The main 
“problematic” for Christianity, in Hegel’s eyes, had to do with 
implementing the “Kingdom of God” spoken of in the Gospels. 
Strongly influenced by the French and German Enlightenment, 
Hegel was interested in overcoming the “myths” of religion, especially 
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accounts of miracles. After graduation from the seminary at Tübingen, 
like Thomas Jefferson, David Strauss, Ernest Renan, and others in that 
era, he wrote a “Life of Jesus,”5 portraying Jesus as the founder of a 
“virtue-religion,” and reinterpreting Jesus’ alleged “miracles.” After 
working for some years as a private tutor, Hegel finally opted for a 
career in philosophy. But to the end of his life, (once, in response to 
someone’s complaint to authorities about Hegel’s bias against 
Catholics), Hegel made frequent affirmations of his fidelity to 
Lutheranism. 
In his philosophy, he never left theology far behind. Like 
Aquinas, it would be difficult to put Hegel into some neat “philosophy” 
or “theology” category. It was partly because of this that theologian 
Karl Barth has called Hegel “the Protestant Aquinas.”6 To be sure, 
Hegel did not give much attention to Thomas Aquinas himself, in his 
lectures on the history of medieval philosophy; nevertheless, in spite 
of frequent criticisms of Roman Catholicism, he evinces grudging 
admiration for Catholic theologians: 
 
The philosophical or speculative element is much greater in 
Catholic dogmatics. In the Protestant doctrinal system or in 
Protestant dogmatics . . . the content is, on the contrary, more 
historical in kind or more vested in a historical form, with the 
result that the doctrine becomes arid. In the Catholic Church the 
linkage of theology with philosophy has in substance always 
been preserved.7 
 
He then argues that the “modern principle” that the content of the 
New Testament should be treated “with the methods of philological 
and historical criticism” is “a perverse approach” in seeking the truth 
of the Christian religion.8 And he supports a position that now may 
seem a bit extreme: namely, that “theology continues to be through 
and through the same thing as philosophy and it cannot separate itself 
from philosophy.”9 However, there are theologians who consider this 
an approach worth cultivating. Hans Küng, for instance, in his The 
Incarnation of God, expands on Hegel’s philosophical/theological 
interpretation of the Incarnation, and Cyril O’Regan in The Heterodox 
Hegel offers a largely sympathetic excursus on Hegel’s multiple 
philosophical investigations of traditional Christian doctrines. 
But as Hegel began working out his “System” toward the onset 
of the nineteenth century, the traditional Scholastic view of philosophy 
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as the “handmaiden of theology” was inverted—not in the sense that 
theology became subordinate to philosophy, but in so far as theology 
became an indispensable impetus to philosophy. As mentioned above, 
Hegel viewed the history of philosophy in terms of successive attempts 
to bring together being and thought—a goal that (as Hegel interprets 
it) has also been the earmark of religion, and has been achieved most 
successfully in the Christian religion. In modern philosophy, according 
to Hegel, approximations to that same goal had also, providentially, 
been made; and Hegel saw his own vocation as a philosopher in 
furthering (or even completing) this process through a systematic 
speculation on the truths of the Christian faith. Concrete traditional 
Christian doctrines provide for the philosopher Vorstellungen,“picture-
thoughts” which need to be explored conceptually for philosophical 
truths. “Speculation,” it should be emphasized, had no pejorative 
connotation for Hegel, as it often does now; and the process of 
speculating on Christian doctrines is a keynote of all his major works. 
Thus Hegel characterizes his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit as 
an intellectual passion-play, a reenactment of the “Golgotha of the 
human spirit,”10 tracing the philosophical quest for an “absolute” 
standpoint beyond the dichotomies and alienations of realism, 
idealism, and other “-isms.” Toward the end of this work, this 
“absolute” standpoint is charted by Hegel as finally emerging in the 
aftermath of a journey passing through ancient “nature-religion” and 
Hellenic “art-religion” to Christianity, the “absolute religion.” He 
focuses on the Virgin Birth as symbolizing the universal experience of 
individual self-consciousness uniting with the divine substance.11 
Hegel’s later works are a continuation of the same overall 
philosophical/theological project. He describes his Science of Logic as a 
speculative investigation of “the life of God before the creation of the 
world”,12 nature, in his Philosophy of Nature, is the external son of god 
(“the son of God, but not as the Son, but as abiding in otherness—the 
divine Idea as held fast for a moment outside the divine love”13); 
political philosophy is the investigation of the “march of God” 
in the progressive development of human society.14 His Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Religion, published posthumously in three volumes, 
are credited with establishing the Philosophy of Religion as a distinct 
and mainstream area of scholarship. And at the outset of his 
posthumously-published Lectures on the Philosophy of History, he 
criticizes theologians who give mere pious affirmations of Divine 
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Providence, without trying to show its workings in the real world. 
Hegel then gives a particularly clear indication to his students of his 
own theological/philosophical approach: 
 
God wishes no narrow-hearted souls or empty heads for his 
children; but those whose spirit is of itself indeed, poor, but rich 
in the knowledge of Him; and who regard this knowledge of God 
as the only valuable possession. . . . It was for awhile the 
fashion to profess admiration for the wisdom of God, as 
displayed in animals, plants, and isolated occurrences. But, if it 
be allowed that Providence manifests itself in such objects and 
forms of existence, why not also in Universal History? . . . Our 
mode of treating the subject is . . . a Theodicaea—a justification 
of the ways of God.15 
 
Hegel then goes on in his lectures on history, starting with China 
and other ancient civilizations, then through Greek and Roman and 
Germanic history, developing his thesis that the ineluctable flow of the 
human spirit has been away from hegemonies in which one man was 
free, then to aristocracies and oligarchies in which an elite group or 
groups attained freedom, and finally to the modern concept of a free 
society, whose ultimate quest is for all humans to be free16 (this is the 
insight which gave rise, with considerable modifications, to Francis 
Fukuyama’s 1992 interpretation of the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
The End of History and the Last Man). 
As Cyril O’Regan and others have noted, Hegel harbored a 
special admiration for the theology of the German mystic, Jacob 
Boehme, who is famous for attempting to systematically portray the 
workings of the Holy Trinity in creation, throughout nature, and in the 
workings of the human spirit. One instance of Hegel’s admiration for 
this Trinitarian methodology is his characterization of “triplicity” as the 
“absolute method”—not in terms of (the frequently-heard Hegel-
stereotype) “thesis, antithesis, synthesis” terminology used by Hegel’s 
contemporary, Fichte—but in the conceptual analysis of movements 
from “in-itself, for-itself, in-and-for-itself,” “universal, particular, 
individual,” and other triads. Hegel’s Trinitarian interest became most 
evident in his treatise on the proofs for the existence of God, when, 
after criticizing the “ontological proofs” which attempt to establish 
God’s existence from the concept of a “being than whom nothing 
greater can be thought,” he develops his own Trinitarian version of the 
proof, as Patricia Calton shows in Hegel’s Metaphysics of God: The 
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Ontological Proof as the Development of a Trinitarian Divine Ontology. 
There is a legend that St. Augustine, meditating on the Trinity while 
walking along the seashore, was warned by an angel that he would 
never be able to comprehend the mystery. In contrast, Hegel was 
optimistic about finding rich philosophical meaning in that doctrine. 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Hegel, who in his 
seminary days, thought it necessary to get beyond the “positive” 
trappings of doctrine and ritual in orthodox Lutheranism, found the 
proper vocation of the theologian to consist in philosophical 
contemplation as the highest and most mature type of religious 
worship: 
 
The inwardness of the heart’s worship and our pictorial thinking 
is not the highest form of inwardness. As this purest form of 
knowledge we must recognize untrammeled thinking in which 
philosophy brings to our minds the same content [as in religion] 
and thereby attains that most spiritual worship in which thinking 
makes its own and knows conceptually what otherwise is only 
the content of subjective feeling or pictorial thinking.17 
 
Church and State 
The early interest of Hegel in the Christian belief in the Kingdom 
of God did not flag after his seminary days, but continued and even 
broadened. As I have brought out in my 1993 book Democracy and 
the “Kingdom of God”, the majority of theologians today consider the 
“Kingdom of God” to be the most important “symbol” of the Gospels, 
although there have been ongoing disputes about the interpretation of 
the Kingdom in terms of its presence now vs. its relegation to a 
hereafter.18 Is the Church the Kingdom of God already present in the 
world, as Augustine and other patristic theologians thought? Or is the 
Kingdom to be attained only with the second coming of Christ? or only 
in the next world? Hegel in great measure agreed with Augustine, 
observing in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion that, “the 
church is the kingdom of God, the achieved presence, life, 
preservation, and enjoyment of the Spirit.”19 But this kingdom, in 
Hegel’s view, will necessarily spill over into the community at large 
and validate the worldly realm. 
 
When the Kingdom of God has won a place in the world and is 
active in penetrating worldly aims and interests and therefore in 
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transfiguring them, when father, mother, brother, meet in the 
community, then the worldly realm too for its part begins to 
claim and assert its right to validity.20 
 
As mentioned above, with reference to Hegel’s philosophy of history, 
all of history is interpreted by Hegel as an evolution to greater and 
greater subjective freedom, leading in the modern world to the 
emergence of the “free state.” Roman Catholicism, in Hegel’s view, 
had been for Christians an impediment in the achievement of this goal, 
because of the dichotomies which it allegedly perpetuated between 
priesthood and layperson, the spirit and the flesh, the Church and the 
world. But Lutheranism is extolled by Hegel as the champion of the 
true Christian spirit, finally bringing about the resolution of such 
dichotomies. For example, Hegel offers the following contrast of the 
historically emerging Lutheran spirit with the three vows of poverty, 
chastity and obedience, which were central to Catholic religious 
orders: 
 
Once the divine spirit introduces itself into reality, and reality 
emancipates itself to spirit, then what in the world was a 
postulate of holiness is supplanted by the reality of moral life. 
Instead of the vow of chastity, marriage now ranks as the 
ethical relation; and, therefore, as the highest on this side of 
humanity stands the family. Instead of the vow of poverty 
(muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to 
whosoever gives away goods to the poor, i.e. whosoever 
enriches them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through 
one’s own intelligence and industry,—of honesty in commercial 
dealing, and in the use of property—in short, moral life in the 
socio-economic sphere. And instead of the vow of obedience, 
true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal 
arrangements of the state—an obedience which is itself the true 
freedom, because the state is self-possessed, self-realizing 
reason—in short, moral life in the state. Thus, and thus only, 
can law and morality exist.21 
 
In other words, the Protestant Reformation had laid the foundation for 
the universal attainment of freedom in and with the secular realm: 
 
In the Protestant state, the constitution and the code, as well as 
their several applications, embody the principle and the 
development of the moral life, which proceeds and can only 
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proceed from the truth of religion, when reinstated in its original 
principle and in that way as such first become actual. The moral 
life of the state and the religious spirituality of the state are thus 
reciprocal guarantees of strength.22 
 
The Protestantism that Hegel had in mind was the extremely 
community-oriented Lutheranism prominent at that time in Germany; 
and Hegel was optimistic about the close and mutually constructive 
relationship between state and church that would result: 
 
The state discharges a duty by affording every assistance and 
protection to the church in the furtherance of its religious ends; 
and, in addition, since religion is an integrating factor in the 
state, implanting a sense of unity in the depths of men’s minds, 
the state should even require [!] all its citizens to belong to a 
church—a church is all that can be said, because since the 
content of a man’s faith depends on his private ideas, the state 
cannot interfere with it.23 
 
In retrospect, we can see that the political problematic that Hegel was 
dealing with contrasts remarkably with the problematic we are most 
conscious of—not the separation of church and state, but the 
harmonious union and cooperation between church and state, between 
the kingdom of God and the kingdom of this world—already achieved 
in principle through the breakthroughs of Protestant Christianity, which 
has “rolled up its sleeves” and worked to transform the world, rather 
than escape from it or dictate to it (Hegel’s stereotype of medieval 
Catholicism). Such an ideal will seem idyllic to Americans, influenced 
by a constitutional bill of rights which evinces intense consciousness of 
the dangers of a too-close relationship between church and state. On 
the other hand, it may be worthwhile to contemplate what might be 
the result if those standing on each side of the proverbial “wall of 
separation between state and church” were able to aggressively and 
systematically cultivate areas of mutual cooperation.  
 
Democracy, Reconsidered 
Hegel, although a serious apologist for a “free modern state,” 
was no fan of democracy. Political philosophers from within 
democracy, such as John Stuart Mill, have warned about the possibility 
of a “tyranny of the majority” which always has the potential to 
subjugate or endanger minorities in any established democracy. 
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Hegel’s qualms about democracy were somewhat similar. In a 
democracy, Hegel saw the ever-present possibility of the 
“preponderating majority of freemen,” after having attained their goal 
of participation in the sovereignty of the state, basing their influence 
“on the principle of multeity or mere numbers.” But even this, in 
Hegel’s view, was not the major weakness with democracies. Hegel’s 
primary reservations about democracy stemmed from his metaphysics, 
which envisioned an “organic” union of “nature” and “spirit” in politics, 
as in other areas. In other words, a successful political constitution, as 
Hegel conceptualized it, would be one which is based on the natural 
associations or groupings which have developed historically in a 
society, and which are able to be elevated to a higher “spiritual” unity, 
ideally operating after the pattern of an organism (this notion of a 
“political organism,” of course, was the aspect that Hitler’s 
philosophers latched onto, and exploited for their own purposes). One 
of Hegel’s counter-examples of the failure to coordinate nature and 
spirit was Napoleon’s attempt to impose a well-thought-out, liberal 
constitution per impossibile on Spain.  
To be sure, there was a paucity of democratic states in the early 
nineteenth century that could serve Hegel as models. The historic 
eighteenth-century political maneuvers of non-native, motley groups 
of European immigrants in America must have seemed to Hegel like an 
overly cerebral attempt, with insufficient grounding in nature and 
historical precedents, to “invent” a constitutional government (to use 
Garry Wills’s terminology). Also objectionable was the “one man, one 
vote” principle, which is foundational in democracies, and which seems 
to utilize a purely quantitative criterion for participation in 
government. In Hegel’s view, such a government offered an example 
par excellence of a mathematically conditioned, and thus inorganic 
political society. 
Hegel has been unjustly criticized as idealizing an extant 
Prussian monarchical form of government. Hegel’s ideal government 
was indeed monarchical; but the model which seemed uppermost in 
his mind was the British style of limited monarchy, in which the 
monarch would be largely limited to “dotting the i’s and crossing the 
t’s” in a parliamentary government. The type of representation that 
Hegel opted for—trade organizations, churches, educational 
institutions, and other “corporations” sending representatives to 
parliament—did not prevail in the Prussia of his time. In other words, 
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Hegel’s political philosophy was a reformist ideal, in the context of the 
then-prevailing Prussian hegemony. 
If it be granted to Hegel that giving “natural groupings” 
adequate representation in government might be a healthy 
development, and if we look for any promising developments of that 
sort in current American politics, our attention might turn to lobbies 
and lobbyists as a “natural” ground-swell influencing our government 
(going well beyond Hegel’s concept of “corporations,” however). But 
more precisely—with the exception of Common Cause as a “citizen’s 
lobby”—we might see most of these power brokers as an oligarchic, 
rather than a democratic, type of input. 
Not infrequently in our pragmatically-oriented culture, people 
ask (or wonder) about the usefulness of philosophy. Hegel’s response 
to that challenge is paradoxical: the primary “useful” contribution of 
philosophy is the progressive enhancement of the self-consciousness 
of mankind. Like Socrates, the “father of Western philosophy,” Hegel 
saw his vocation as the investigation of the “big” questions—what is 
the best form of government? the relationship between faith and 
knowledge? the best way to coordinate religion and politics? As we 
look into the nuances connected with these questions, we sometimes 
encounter some useful “practical” insights. This is not the goal of our 
investigation, however, but an occasional welcome side-effect. 
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